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THE ROBERTS COURT'S FAILED INNOCENCE PROJECT
JANET C. HOEFFEL*
"The dilemma is how to harness DNA's power to prove innocence with-
out unnecessarily overthrowing the established system of criminal jus-
tice."l
"The sky is falling." - Chicken Little
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the Roberts Court lost its grip on wrongful convictions. An
opportunity to do the right thing presented itself in District Attorney's Of-
fice for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne2 and the majority of the
Court balked. In Osborne, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, held there is no federal constitutional right to
access evidence in the State's possession in order to conduct a DNA test
that would conclusively prove innocence. 3
Judicial restraint, federalism, and comity were all brought to bear on
this recurring, nagging problem of the man who cries foul, or "Innocent!"
Yet those rationales sounded in desperation rather than reason. Fear of
slippery slopes, the floodgates, and the crashing of the entire criminal jus-
tice system drove the Court's decision. 4 Osborne was another nail in the
coffin the Court had been constructing for the theoretically "innocent"
since Herrera v. Collins5 in 1993.
In Herrera, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, all
but severed any relationship between a claim of actual innocence and the
Constitution. He assumed, without deciding, that the imprisonment of an
actually innocent person did not violate the Constitution.6 For the sake of
* Catherine D. Pierson Professor of Law and Vice Dean of Academic Affairs, Tulane Law
School.
1. Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316 (2009).
2. 129 S. Ct. 2308.
3. Id. at 2321-23.
4. See infra notes 85-102 and accompanying text.
5. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
6. Id. at 398, In delivering the opinion for the Court, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist cited prece-
dent for the concept that a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence is not a
ground for habeas relief, but is only a gateway to a cognizable constitutional claim. Id. at 400, 404; see
infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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argument, however, he left a loophole, saying it might be possible "that in a
capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made
after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional .... 7
At that time, DNA testing was just gaining traction in the courtrooms
as a tool to secure convictions. 8 A "truly persuasive" showing of innocence
was not imaginable to the Justices then. Therefore Justice Scalia could
concur with the majority in Herrera though he would have closed the loop-
hole forever, and he could surmise that this "embarrassing question," 9 as he
called it, would not recur.
That embarrassing question recurred with a vengeance. In the follow-
ing decade and a half, DNA testing emerged as a powerful tool for exon-
eration of the wrongfully convicted.l 0 Since Chief Justice Roberts took the
bench in 2005, the specter of wrongful convictions has been firmly in the
public conscience. Innocence Projects are embedded in law schools, l I state
legislatures have debated partial solutions to the problem, 12 and practically
every criminal procedure professor in the country has participated in a
symposium on "what to do" about wrongful convictions. 
1 3
Only the Court has fallen far behind. The "truly persuasive" showing
of innocence has arrived, and the Roberts Court cannot embrace it or even
look it in the eye. DNA's silver bullet to innocence has caused dissenting
members of the Court to pull at the seams of Herrera but even they cannot
figure out what to do. In two cases that came before the Roberts Court, it
had a chance to retool Herrera and confirm the existence of a constitutional
7. Id. at417.
8. See Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence
Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465, 476-77 (1990) (discussing the introduction of
DNA evidence into courtrooms beginning in 1987).
9. 506 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("With any luck, we shall avoid ever having to face
this embarrassing question again, since it is improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as
today's opinion requires would fail to produce an executive pardon.").
10. See, e.g., Innocence Project Case Files, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited
Sept. 25, 2009) (citing 242 cases of DNA exoneration, and showing the number of exonerations per
year, increasing into the early twenty-first century).
I1. There are over sixty Innocence Projects across the United States, some housed in law schools
and Universities and some free-standing. See Innocence Network Member Organizations,
http://www.innocencenetwork.org/members.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2009) (listing Innocence Pro-
jects).
12. See Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316
(2009) (citing forty-six states as having enacted statutes dealing with access to DNA evidence); Stepha-
nie Roberts & Lynne Weathered, Assisting the Factually Innocent: The Contradictions and Compatibil-
ity of Innocence Projects and the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 29 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 43, 47
(2009) (discussing legislative reforms including requirements for police to tape interrogations of sus-
pects and opportunities for post-conviction DNA testing and access to courts).
13. Indeed, this article was generated as a result of such a symposium. A quick search on Westlaw
reveals at least eleven published law review symposia on innocence/wrongful convictions in the last
seven years.
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right to prove actual innocence in light of DNA technology. One was
House v. Bell' 4 and the other was Osborne. Instead, in House v. Bell, the
Court ratcheted up the standard of proof for freestanding innocence claims
so high that it conceivably could never be met.15 Then, in Osborne, the
cognitive dissonance is laid bare: the Herrera standard of proof can in fact
be met through a DNA test, but the Court found there is no right to make
that proof.' 
6
What these two cases, and the dissenting opinions in two other Rob-
erts Court cases, 17 show is a deep-seated fear of the power of DNA. This
article argues that this fear is hyperbolic and unwarranted. Conclusive
proof of innocence through DNA is available in only a small number of
cases. 18 The far greater fear is what it means to reject the claim - what does
it say to individuals and society that we prefer the imprisonment or the
execution of innocents over an avenue to prove their claim beyond any
reasonable doubt?
The Court will need to revisit its decision in Osborne and directly
confront the open question in Herrera with a definitive and reasonable
standard for the cases that are in fact "truly persuasive" cases of innocence
because of DNA test results. While not previously taken seriously, the
Court must now embrace the fundamental and deeply-held principle that
continued imprisonment of the innocent person violates the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. To do otherwise is nothing
short of an embarrassment to our system of justice.
I. INNOCENCE CLAIMS BEFORE DNA
Before the rise of DNA exonerations and the so-called Innocence
Movement, the Court had little reason to take much stock in claims of in-
nocence. As a former public defender who handled cases at trial and on
appeal, I can say that many claims of innocence are made, but few are sus-
tained. Once convicted, a claim of innocence is highly suspect. As Morgan
14. 547 U.S. 518 (2006).
15. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra notes 44-78 and accompanying text (discussing Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163
(2006) and Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008)).
18. The case has to have involved the deposit of human cellular material in an amount and manner
that can be tested and would provide conclusive evidence of innocence. A prototypical case is a one-
perpetrator rape case where the defense is misidentification, not consent. While 240 cases of DNA-
proven innocence nationwide since the late 1990s is a significant number, it is certainly not a number
that brings the criminal justice system to a halt.
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Freeman quips in The Shawshank Redemption, "Everyone in [prison] is
innocent. Didn't you know that?"'19
This is likely the perspective with which the Court approached Leonel
Torres Herrera's claim of innocence in 1992. Ten years earlier, he was
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for the killing of a po-
lice officer. The evidence against him included two police officers' identi-
fications of him, identification of the car used in the killings as belonging
to Herrera's girlfriend, blood on his blue jeans matching the blood type of
another police officer who was shot during the same time and not matching
his, his social security card found at the scene of that other officer's shoot-
ing, and a handwritten letter on his person when arrested that implied he
committed the killings. 20
Eight years after his conviction, Herrera's new evidence of innocence
was that his brother committed the crime. His brother was now dead, but
his brother's lawyer, his brother's former cellmate and others said that the
brother confessed to committing the crime. 21 There may well have been a
colorable story here of an innocent, mentally impaired man getting framed
by his crime-savvy brother for the murder, such that upon a retrial a good
defense attorney could have been able to make a case for reasonable doubt.
However, Herrera was not a case of obvious, or even suspected, innocence.
Indeed, no member of the Court postulated Leonel Herrera's inno-
cence. Rather, the question was, if a reasonable juror could now, with the
new evidence, have a reasonable doubt about the criminal defendant's
guilt, does the Constitution give him a new trial? This question was not
new. Hence, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Townsend v. Sain22 for the
principle that newly discovered evidence can only lead to a federal habeas
claim when it "'bear[s] upon the constitutionality of the applicant's deten-
tion; the existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the
guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas cor-
pus.' 23 The incantation of this familiar historical limitation on federal
habeas was not surprising as Herrera had not given the Court a persuasive
claim of innocence.
19. Wikipedia, The Shawshank Redemption,
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/TheShawshankRedemption (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
20. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393-95 (1993).
21. Id. at396.
22. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
23. 506 U.S. at 400 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Townsend, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)). Further,
federal habeas courts "sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-
not to correct errors of fact." Id.
[Vol 85:1
THE ROBERTS COURT'S FAILED INNOCENCE PROJECT
While the shadow Herrera has subsequently cast is wide, 24 the hold-
ing is actually quite narrow. Then-Chief Justice Rehnquist limited the hold-
ing to the facts of Herrera's case.25 Concurring Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy made clear that "Dispositive to this case.., is an equally funda-
mental fact: Petitioner is not innocent, in any sense of the word."'26 What to
do about a convicted innocent man was not before the Court and the Court
did not decide that question.
Most significantly, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist left a loophole that,
to this date, has remained open. He conceded, "We may assume, for the
sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a capital case a truly persua-
sive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the
execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief
if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim."' 27 Three of the
concurring justices found this loophole more than an assumption. Justices
O'Connor, for herself and Justice Kennedy, wrote, "I cannot disagree with
the fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent
with the Constitution[,]" and "the execution of a legally and factually inno-
cent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event."'28 Justice White
wrote separately in agreement and to suggest a standard of proof for such a
claim.29
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas in concurrence, would have
preferred to close the loophole and decide once and for all that there is no
freestanding claim of innocence under any circumstances. However, he
accepted the loophole, "because I can understand, or at least am accus-
tomed to, the reluctance of the present Court to admit publicly that Our
Perfect Constitution lets stand any injustice, much less the execution of an
innocent man who has received, though to no avail, all the process that our
24. Herrera can appear to the reader as the case that decided actual innocence is not a cognizable
claim on habeas corpus, even though it did not decide that question. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The
Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1332, 1362 n.135
(2008) (citing Herrera as disallowing habeas relief for actual innocence claims unless there is an inde-
pendent constitutional violation).
25. After summarizing Herrera's new evidence claim, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: "Peti-
tioner urges us to hold that this showing of innocence entitles him to relief in this federal habeas pro-
ceeding. We hold that it does not." 506 U.S. at 393.
26. Id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 417 (majority opinion).
28. Id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29. Justice White suggested that to be entitled to relief, a petitioner would have to show that,
based on the new evidence and the entire trial record, "'no rational trier of fact could [find] proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 324 (1979)).
20101
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society has traditionally deemed adequate."' 30 One can assume Justice Sca-
lia was not terribly worried, however, because it was unlikely that the
Court would have to face "this embarrassing question again,"'31 since no
petitioner was likely to meet the "truly persuasive demonstration" of inno-
cence that Herrera would require. The end result of Herrera is that a ma-
jority of the Court left open a door to a freestanding constitutional claim of
actual innocence.
A mere two years after Herrera, the Court made the "truly persuasive
demonstration" practically out of reach in Schiup v. Delo.32 Schiup ad-
dressed a narrow "miscarriage of justice" exception for habeas claimants
who were procedurally barred from presenting their constitutional claims.
In essence, a prisoner could assert his innocence as a gateway to considera-
tion of his defaulted constitutional claims but not as a constitutional claim
in and of itself.33
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, defined the standard a petitioner
had to meet for the exception. A petitioner would have to establish that, in
light of new evidence, "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."'34 This
standard would ensure "that petitioner's case is truly 'extraordinary." 35 On
the other hand, Justice Stevens stated that a freestanding innocence "Herre-
ra-type claim would have to fail unless the federal habeas court is itself
convinced that those new facts unquestionably establish [petitioner's] inno-
cence." 36
Reading Schiup and Herrera together, one is at a loss to differentiate a
"truly 'extraordinary"' claim of innocence from a "truly persuasive" or
"unquestionable" claim of innocence. With cases of DNA exoneration still
gathering on the horizon and not yet in the forefront, this distinction may
not have made much practical difference. However, when the Roberts
Court took its first "innocence" case, it had an opportunity to close this
unrealistic gap.
30. Id. at 428, 428 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring) (referencing Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981) ("[N]ot every problem was meant to be solved by the
United States Constitution, nor can be.").
31. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 428.
32. See 513 U.S. 298, 314 n.28 (1995).
33. Id. at 314-15.
34. Id. at 327.
35. Id. (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 317.
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II. HOUSE V. BELL: A POST-DNA INNOCENCE CLAIM
In 2006, Paul Gregory House came as close as one could-without a
silver bullet-to showing the Court he was actually innocent. Justice Ken-
nedy, for a bare majority in House v. Bell,37 bent over backward to demon-
strate House's innocence. He painstakingly covered the evidence presented
at trial and the new evidence, both forensic and testimonial. Central foren-
sic proof was "called into question" and "substantial evidence" pointed to a
different suspect.38 Justice Kennedy engaged in an intensive fact-finding
mission, unrestrained by prior findings of the district court. 39 A central,
although not conclusive, piece of this new evidence was a DNA test on
evidence at the scene of the crime that showed Mr. House was not the
source.40
Mr. House's powerful case of innocence was a chance for the Court to
clarify the Herrera claimant's burden. Instead, Justice Kennedy continued
the muddling of the boundaries. He concluded that House met the Schiup
standard of presenting a "truly 'extraordinary"' case of innocence such that
it was more likely than not that no reasonable juror would find him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt after hearing the new evidence. 41 However,
after describing the new evidence in this "extraordinary" case of demon-
strated innocence, Kennedy stated blankly, "This is not a case of conclusive
exoneration. '42 Of course: any convicted person has some evidence against
him or he never would have been convicted. Every case of DNA exonera-
tion has had some proof of guilt: an eyewitness, a confession, forensic evi-
dence, a jailhouse snitch.
Further, Kennedy declined to clarify the terms of a "truly persuasive"
showing of innocence under Herrera: "[W]hatever burden a hypothetical
freestanding innocence claim would require, this petitioner has not satisfied
it," because in Herrera, "the Court described the threshold for any hypo-
37. 547 U.S. 518 (2006).
38. Id. at 554.
39. Indeed, Kennedy's partially dissenting colleagues took him to task for "casting aside the
District Court's factual determinations made after a comprehensive evidentiary hearing." Id. at 561
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40. New DNA testing on the semen on the victim's nightgown showed that it belonged to her
husband not to Paul House, as the State had argued at trial. Id. at 540. House also introduced other new
evidence pointing to the victim's husband as her killer. As House was charged with her murder and not
her rape, this DNA test undermined the State's case, but did not conclusively obviate it. Justice Ken-
nedy stated that the DNA evidence was of "central importance." Id. The evidence at trial was largely
circumstantial and the semen stain "was the only forensic evidence at the scene that would link House
to the murder." Id. at 541.
41. Id. at 554.
42. Id. at 553.
2010]
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thetical freestanding innocence claim as 'extraordinarily high.' ' 43 This
word play between "extraordinary" and "extraordinarily high" is deeply
confounding. It effectively leaves only one kind of case for a freestanding
innocence claim: one of "conclusive exoneration," a practically impossible
burden.
The portent of House v. Bell is that if a prisoner has an "extraordi-
nary" case of innocence, although short of a "conclusive" case, it is not a
claim of "constitutional" significance. Rather, this extraordinary claim of
innocence allows the petitioner to now go back and litigate his "constitu-
tional" claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial
misconduct. This is a deeply fractured concept of a "miscarriage of jus-
tice." While it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would find
the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he must still show a par-
ticular "constitutional" cause for the erroneous conviction in order to win
his freedom.
The Roberts Court accepted Paul House's case to clarify the Schlup
standard but not to clarify the Herrera standard. The Roberts Court's
avoidance of the Herrera claim, continuing to make it theoretically out of
reach, was in the face of DNA exonerations occurring across the country. A
look at two other cases the Roberts Court decided between 2006 and 2008
offer a small window into the reasons for the Court's reluctance to constitu-
tionalize an innocence claim.
III. THE ROBERTS COURT'S INTERNAL STRUGGLE WITH WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS
It was inevitable that the Roberts Court Justices were thinking about
DNA exonerations. For the liberal wing of the Court, the wrongful convic-
tions were not sitting well. Several Justices' fractured thoughts on the issue
finally burst forth in two death penalty cases where it was arguably irrele-
vant.
The 2006 case of Kansas v. Marsh44 was an unlikely case for a discus-
sion of innocence. At issue was whether the Kansas death penalty statute,
which required the imposition of the death penalty when the sentencing
jury determined that aggravating evidence and mitigating evidence were in
equipoise, violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. Justice Thomas, for the majority, held that it did not.45
43. Id. at 555.
44. 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006).
45. Id. at 2520.
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There is much to debate about the constitutionality of a scheme that allows
a person to be sentenced to death when the jury does not find that the ag-
gravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, but the conviction of
factually innocent persons would not appear to be part of this debate.
Nonetheless, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and
Breyer, seemed to have been lying in wait for an opportunity to raise the
issue of wrongful convictions of death row inmates. In his dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Souter cited various reports that discussed the numbers and
cases of innocent men who were under a sentence of death before being
exonerated.46 He found that "[w]e are thus in a period of new empirical
argument about how 'death is different': not only would these false verdicts
defy correction after the fatal moment, the Illinois experience shows them
to be remarkable in number, and they are probably disproportionately high
in capital cases."'47
Calling the Kansas statute's solution to equipoise a "moral irrational-
ity,"48 Justice Souter marshaled the wrongful conviction data as a "new
body of fact [that] must be accounted for in deciding what" the Eighth
Amendment should tolerate. 49 His tenuous link between the issue in the
case and the issue of wrongful convictions was that, in the face of proof of
wrongful convictions of those on death row, it was amoral to expand the
reach of the death penalty in this manner.
50
Justice Souter stopped short of using the "new body of fact" to call for
an end to the death penalty. He stated that "it is far too soon for any gener-
alization about the soundness of capital sentencing across the country[.]" 51
However, there is no valid rationale upon which to distinguish between a
discontinuation of expansion of the death penalty and a discontinuation of
the death penalty at all. Either the fact of wrongful convictions makes the
imposition of the death penalty unconstitutional or it does not.
52
46. Id. at 2544-45 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing former Illinois Governor Ryan's REPORT OF THE
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS (2002); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in
the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2006); Charles S. Lanier &
James R. Acker, Capital Punishment, the Moratorium Movement, and Empirical Questions, 10
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 577 (2004)).




51. Id. at 2545.
52. The legal argument for abolition was there for the taking if Justice Souter had wanted to make
it. In Furman v. Georgia, the Court found that the country's then-existing system of capital punishment
led to arbitrary imposition of the punishment, which violated the Eighth Amendment. 408 U.S. 238,
239-240 (1972) (per curiam). At the time, fact finders had unbounded discretion to choose when to
impose the ultimate penalty and chose it infrequently and randomly. See id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring), 311-12 (White, J., concurring). The capital punishment systems that states put in place
20101
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Justice Souter's digression on wrongful convictions was weak and
unconvincing. No response would appear to have been needed from other
members of the Court. The fact that Justices Thomas and Scalia delivered
swift and strong responses anyway revealed more about their fear of the
effect of an innocence claim on the criminal justice system.
Justice Thomas raised the specter of abolition in response: "Because
the criminal justice system does not operate perfectly, abolition of the death
penalty is the only answer to the moral dilemma the dissent poses. This
Court, however, does not sit as a moral authority.
'53
Justice Scalia wrote his own separate concurrence to dismiss the dis-
sent's digression as irrelevant and to argue the wrongful convictions issue
head on. Echoing his concurring opinion in Herrera, he declared, "[o]ne
cannot have a system of criminal punishment without accepting the possi-
bility that someone will be punished mistakenly. That is a truism, not a
revelation." 54 As for what should be done about that possibility, he pro-
claimed: "The American people have determined that the good to be de-
rived from capital punishment-in deterrence, and perhaps most of all in
the meting out of condign justice for horrible crime-outweighs the risk of
error. '55 It is very unclear, however, that the American people have de-
cided this question with the full facts in front of them.
56
Most revealing about Justice Scalia's opinion was his vehemence in
denying that the problem of wrongful convictions actually exists in signifi-
cant numbers to be of any concern. As to the execution of an innocent man,
he baldly asserted there is no such case.57 He took issue with the reports
relied upon by Justice Souter in both their accuracy and in their classifica-
after Furman were constitutional to the extent that they ensured that the death penalty was not imposed
under "sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). Applied to today's circumstances,
Justice Souter could have argued that the number of DNA exonerations indicate a "substantial risk" of
"arbitrary and capricious" imposition of the punishment. The debate would likely turn on the meaning
of "substantial" in this context.
53. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2529.
54. Id. at 2539 (Scalia, J., concurring).
55. Id.
56. The number of death sentences imposed by juries, and the number of executions carried out,
has declined significantly in recent years. See Kenneth C. Haas, The Emerging Death Penalty Jurispru-
dence of the Roberts Court, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 387, 427-428 (citing statistics). While polls still show the
vast majority of Americans are in favor of capital punishment, the number of Americans in favor of the
death penalty drops when life without the possibility of parole is given as an available option. Id. at 428
(citing polling data). As Justice Marshall warned in Furman, the more the population is educated, the
less they will be in favor of capital punishment. 408 U.S. at 361-63 (Marshall, J., concurring). The
number in favor would drop even more if the public were asked if it was still in favor if a number of
death row inmates awaiting execution were innocent with no avenue of relief.
57. 126 S. Ct. at 2533 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he dissent does not discuss a single case-not
one-in which it is clear that a person was executed for a crime he did not commit.").
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tion of certain cases as exonerations of the "innocent." 58 His fierceness in
arguing against the data belied his initial blas6 attitude toward the problem
of error. 59
In 2008, Justice Stevens took the bat from Justice Souter in a concur-
ring opinion in Baze v. Rees.60 Once again, actual innocence was not di-
rectly relevant to the issue presented. Justice Stevens wedged it in. In a case
about the constitutionality of Kansas' lethal injection protocol, he wrote,
"[t]he time for a dispassionate, impartial comparison of the enormous costs
that death penalty litigation imposes on society with the benefits that it
produces has surely arrived."'6 1 However, as it turned out, not so fast.
Justice Stevens invoked Justice White's "decisive vote" in Furman v.
Georgia62 in 1972 to shore up his own view that the time had come. In
Furman, Justice White had based his conclusion that the death penalty was
being imposed in an arbitrary manner on "a factual premise that he admit-
tedly could not 'prove' on the basis of objective criteria, ' 63 but which
stemmed from his observations from the bench for ten years.64 Likewise,
Justice Stevens relied on his own exposure to capital cases to conclude
"that the imposition of the death penalty represents 'the pointless and need-
less extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible
social or public purpose. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State
[is] patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the
Eighth Amendment.'" 65
58. Id. at 2533-35. Almost every single one of Justice Scalia's scathing retorts is unmet by the
dissent. Professor Samuel Gross, one of the report writers castigated by Justice Scalia, had to explain
where Justice Scalia went wrong and defend his findings in a law review article. See Samuel R. Gross,
Souter Passant, Scalia Rampant: Combat in the Marsh, 105 MIcH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67, 69
(2006) ("[Tlhe true number of wrongful convictions is unknown and frustratingly unknowable. But the
rate that Justice Scalia advocates is flat wrong and badly misleading."). Others have done the same. See,
e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, Litigating in the Shadow of Innocence, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 191 (2006); D.
Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007).
59. Recognizing the potential power of innocence rhetoric, he also expressed concern it might
attract the attention of the "finger-waggers" in other parts of the civilized world. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at
2532-33.
60. 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1542 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 1548-49.
62. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
63. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1550 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 312, 313
(White, J., concurring)).
64. 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (stating he could not "prove" his conclusion but had to
base it on his years of experience with hundreds of capital cases).




Among the reasons Justice Stevens cited for concern 66 was the risk of
error in capital cases, which "may be greater than in other cases, '67 and
therefore "the irrevocable nature of the consequences is of decisive impor-
tance to me."'68 Justice Stevens cited the "abundant evidence accumulated
in recent years" that demonstrated "the exoneration of an unacceptable
number of defendants found guilty of capital offenses. '69 He concluded
that the risk of executing innocent men would be eliminated altogether by
treating any penalty more severe than life imprisonment without parole as
constitutionally excessive.
70
This might have been a watershed moment for Justice Stevens person-
ally but, unlike Justice White, he did not make a watershed decision. The
surprise conclusion was that Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment
upholding the injection procedure. He claimed he must "respect precedents
that remain a part of our law" 71 and under those precedents, which include
a finding that the death penalty is constitutional, Kansas' lethal injection
protocol was constitutional. 72 Let the tinkering continue then.73
Justice Scalia again wrote a separate concurrence to respond. He rep-
rimanded Justice Stevens for believing that his own subjective opinion was
important: "[p]urer expression cannot be found of the principle of rule by
judicial fiat."'74 Again, as in Marsh, Justice Scalia criticized overriding the
opinions of his fellow citizens, 75 and repeated that there was no case of an
innocent man being executed.
Significantly, however, Justice Scalia took his concerns a step further:
"[Justice Stevens'] analysis of this risk is thus a series of sweeping con-
demnations that, if taken seriously, would prevent any punishment under
66. Other reasons for concern were selection of a conviction-prone death-qualified jury, and the
risk of discriminatory application. Id. at 1550-51.
67. Id. at 1550 ("[T]he risk of error in capital cases may be greater than in other cases because the
facts are often so disturbing that the interest in making sure the crime does not go unpunished may
overcome residual doubt concerning the identity of the offender.").
68. Id. at 1551.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1552.
72. Id.
73. This is a reference to Justice Blackmun's famous renunciation of the death penalty in Callins
v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145-46 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("From this
day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death... The problem is that the inevitabil-
ity of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some defen-
dants .... ).
74. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1555 (Scalia, J., concurring).
75. Id.
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any criminal justice system."'76 There is the rub then: if we acknowledge
the problem, the only fix is the end of the criminal justice system.
In these two cases, the various members of the Court reproduce the
fears that drove the decision in McCleskey v. Kemp in 1987.77 The legacy
of McCleskey v. Kemp is that if we acknowledge the dirty secrets of our
criminal justice system-in McCleskey's case, racial injustice-it will fall
apart. 78 Just as we cannot ensure a system without racism and racial preju-
dice, we cannot ensure a system without wrongful convictions. However,
the similarity of the two issues is not complete. Whereas it is virtually im-
possible to demonstrate the effect of racism in any one individual case, it is
possible to demonstrate innocence in an individual case.
Perhaps the simplest starting solution was presented to the Court in
District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne79 in
2009. By June 2009, when the Court decided Osborne, some 240 people
had been exonerated with the help of conclusive DNA evidence proving
their innocence. 80 The Court could easily have embraced a Herrera claim
in the few cases where convicted prisoners can conclusively prove their
innocence through a DNA test.
IV. OSBORNE: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO PUSH HERRERA FORWARD
The combined effect of Herrera, Schlup and House left only one pos-
sible avenue for a freestanding claim of actual innocence. As Justice Ken-
nedy stated it in House, theoretically only a conclusive case of innocence
could meet the Herrera burden. He must have known by then that such a
showing could in fact be made through a conclusive DNA test. However,
the Court was not confronted with that issue until Osborne.
76. Id. at 1554.
77. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
78. In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court, per Justice Powell, held that an intensive study of
the Georgia death penalty-indicating that black defendants who kill white victims are sentenced to
death at nearly twenty-two times the rate of blacks who kill blacks and more than seven times the rate
of whites who kill blacks-did not amount to a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias and did not
establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 481 U.S. at 313. When asked what decision he most
regretted as a Member of the Supreme Court, Justice Powell answered McCleskey v. Kemp. JOHN C.
JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451-52 (Charles Scribner's Sons, ed., 1994). Of course, he
reached the decision as a part of his metamorphosis into an opponent of the death penalty. To follow the
study in McCleskey to its logical conclusion would be to find that the death penalty can never be relia-
bly imposed. As Justice Powell said, "Given [the] safeguards already inherent in the imposition and
review of capital sentences, the dissent's call for greater rationality is no less than a claim that a capital
punishment system cannot be administered in accord with the Constitution." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at
313 n.37.
79. 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
80. See Innocence Project Case Files, supra note 10.
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On post-conviction, William Osborne proclaimed his innocence from
charges of kidnapping and sexual assault and requested that the State sup-
ply him with the evidence gathered from the scene of the crime so he could
perform DNA testing, not previously performed, 81 at his own expense.
With no explanation, the State denied him access to the evidence. 82 All
parties conceded that the DNA test, if performed, would conclusively dem-
onstrate Mr. Osborne's guilt or innocence. 83 Nonetheless, Chief Justice
Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, held there
was no federal due process right to access DNA evidence in order to prove
innocence.
A reasonable response to Mr. Osborne's petition might sound some-
thing like Justice Stevens' dissent: "It seems to me obvious that if a wrong-
ly convicted person were to produce proof of his actual innocence, no state
interest would be sufficient to justify his continued punitive detention. If
such proof can be readily obtained without imposing a significant burden
on the State, a refusal to provide access to such evidence is wholly unjusti-
fied." 84
Fear, on the other hand, sounds something like Chief Justice Roberts
for the majority: "The dilemma is how to harness DNA's power to prove
innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the established system of
criminal justice."85 Chief Justice Roberts did not elaborate on how such a
disaster would come to pass. Recognition of the due process claim re-
quested by Osborne would affect a small number of cases. 86 Such an open-
ing could only enhance the public's sense that justice was done.
Chief Justice Roberts sounded the trumpet of judicial restraint over
and over again, emphasizing that this was a matter for the states, not the
federal judiciary. Because the states were coming up with their own solu-
tions to the issue of post-conviction DNA testing, he said:
81. There was some dispute among the Justices as to whether he specifically asked for a type of
DNA testing that had not yet been performed and was not available at the time of trial. The State had
performed a DQ alpha test, which is a relatively inexact test. While the majority suggested that Osborne
only made a request for RFLP testing, which was available at the time of trial, the dissent cites to his
briefs and arguments before the state trial court and the state appellate court that show that he asked for
STR DNA testing, which was not available at the time of trial. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2333 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
82. The majority did not discuss the fact that "for reasons the State has been unable or unwilling
to articulate, it refuses to allow Osborne to test the evidence at his own expense and to thereby ascertain
the truth once and for all." Id. at 2331.
83. The State conceded that a DNA test in Osborne's case would be dispositive of his guilt or
innocence. Id. at 2336.
84. Id. at 2338.
85. Id. at 2316 (majority opinion).
86. See supra note 18.
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[T]he recognition of a freestanding and far-reaching constitutional right
of access.., would take the development of rules and procedures in this
area out of the hands of legislatures and state courts shaping policy in a
focused manner and turn it over to federal courts applying the broad pa-
rameters of the Due Process Clause. There is no reason to constitutional-
ize the issue in this way.87
That the states also recognized a right has never been a satisfactory
reason for rejecting the recognition of a constitutional right. In fact, quite
the opposite has been true. That states have recognized the need for legisla-
tion can in fact indicate that society believes that a right is fundamental. 88
As the dissent pointed out, such a pattern was the history of the recognition
of the right to counsel as applied to the states through the due process
clause. 89
When Chief Justice Roberts did engage in the appropriate legal analy-
sis-whether the right to access evidence for DNA testing was so funda-
mental to ordered liberty as to be constitutionally-protected-he obfuscated
the real issues at stake. First, he jettisoned any procedural due process
claim by claiming that, even if a constitutional right to be released upon
proof of actual innocence existed under Herrera, "there is no due process
problem" 90 because Osborne would be entitled to some discovery under
federal habeas law. 91 Not only did he thereby avoid addressing the exis-
tence of a Herrera claim, there is a due process problem since the only way
Osborne could get through the court doors on a freestanding claim of actual
innocence would be with the results of the DNA test already in hand.
Likewise through a scant analysis, Chief Justice Roberts found no
substantive due process claim. He described Osborne's liberty interest as
seeking "access to state evidence so he can apply new DNA-testing tech-
nology that might prove him innocent. ' 92 With this as the stated liberty
interest, he easily rejected it because "[t]here is no long history of such a
right, and '[t]he mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt
that 'substantive due process' sustains it.' ' '93
87. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2312.
88. See id. at 2335 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The fact that nearly all the States have now recog-
nized some post-conviction right to DNA evidence makes it more, not less, appropriate to recognize a
limited federal right to such evidence .... ").
89. Id. at 2338-39. In addition, as Professor Brandon Garrett has observed, "The adoption of a
federal constitutional innocence claim would provide uniformity and ensure an avenue of relief in the
states that do not yet provide for meaningful adjudication of innocence claims." Brandon Garrett,
Claiming Innocence, 92 MiNN. L. REv. 1629, 1692 (2008).
90. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321-22.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2322.
93. Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993))
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While DNA testing may be novel, Justice Roberts's description is the
narrowest possible way to describe the liberty interest at stake. Rather,
protection of the innocent from wrongful incarceration is a firmly rooted
liberty interest.94 It is true that a convicted man is no longer presumed in-
nocent, but that does not mean the justice system turns a blind eye to proof
of actual innocence. Hence, in Herrera, concurring Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy found it a "fundamental legal principle that executing the inno-
cent is inconsistent with the Constitution." 95 That is precisely why Herrera
left open the potential of a constitutional claim of freestanding innocence.
To disallow a prisoner access to evidence for testing, at his own expense,
that could conclusively show he is innocent is nothing short of arbitrary
and shocking.96
Chief Justice Roberts further argued against finding a due process
right because it "would force us to act as policymakers .... ,"97 He com-
plained that the Court, rather than the states, would have to decide myriad
questions such as whether, as part of the right, evidence had to be preserved
and for how long, and whether it had to be gathered in the first instance. 98
There are two easy responses. First, these questions always follow the find-
ing of a constitutional right, and would be no different than the issues that
flow from the defendant's due process right to exculpatory evidence in the
hands of the government. 99 Second, those are not hard questions. If a ha-
beas petitioner has a right of access to the state's evidence for DNA testing,
the state must preserve it, or the right would be meaningless, but there is no
corollary right to have the evidence gathered in the first instance.
Far more politically controversial than a right to prove actual inno-
cence, the findings of due process rights to abortion, contraceptives, or
interracial marriage all led to questions for the states of what limits they
could place on the right. States are free to choose limitations, as they have
94. Or, as Justice Stevens framed the liberty interest in dissent, there is a deep-rooted ."interest in
being free from physical detention by one's own government."' Id. at 2334 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. 506 U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) ("Nothing could be more contrary to contemporary standards of decency ... than to execute a
person who is actually innocent.").
96. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2336 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("'The touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."' (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215, 226 (1976))); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 435-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("So-called 'substan-
tive due process' prevents the government from engaging in conduct that 'shocks the conscience.'
(quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952))).
97. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2323.
98. Id.
99. For more on a defendant's due process right to exculpatory evidence, see United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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done in statutes allowing for post-conviction DNA testing. The Court
would have to do its usual gate keeping task of deciding whether those
limitations abridge the fundamental right.100
The Court's reluctance to find a due process right of access to DNA
testing was mostly fueled by the slippery slope concerns. Somehow, innu-
merable prisoners would take advantage of this right and the courts would
be clogged with claims of guilty men. Justice Alito's bizarre concurrence,
joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, which raised a host of concerns
about the potential unreliability of DNA testing, 101 echoed this fear. The
very power of DNA to prove conclusive innocence had the majority of
Justices cowering from it, rather than embracing it.
A rationale for this cautionary approach is found in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Souter. While he dissented because he found the state's
post-conviction procedures violated due process, he reserved judgment on
the recognition of a federal due process right. 102 He seemed to apologize
for the Court's and his slowness to recognize this right:
We can change our own inherited views just so fast, and a person is not
labeled a stick-in-the-mud for refusing to endorse a new moral claim
without having some time to work through it intellectually and emotion-
ally.. . the broader society needs the chance to take part in the dialectic
of public and political back and forth about a new liberty claim before it
makes sense to declare unsympathetic state or national laws arbitrary to
the point of being unconstitutional. 103
This is a truly curious statement. It would make sense if he were
speaking on a more controversial subject, such as the definition of marriage
or the right to abortion. But, in this case, what "new moral claim" is he
talking about? It is hard to believe that the majority of American people
would find it morally objectionable to allow a man to conclusively prove
his innocence if he could do so at no expense to the people.
The majority in Osborne rejected an opportunity to abandon its ille-
gitimate fears of the power of DNA to exonerate and to embrace a liberty
interest for those who can prove their innocence through DNA testing. The
Court once again declined to address whether a Herrera claim truly ex-
100. Conditions states have placed on the right include demonstrating materiality, a sworn state-
ment the applicant is innocent, and that testing have been technologically impossible at trial. See Os-
borne, 129 S. Ct. at 2317. More controversial, and arguably unconstitutional, is the limitation of the
right to those who did not decline testing at trial for tactical reasons. See id. at 2317, 2336 n.8 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); see also Garrett, supra note 89, at 1675-84 (describing the "onerous" standards and
limitations for post-conviction DNA testing in the states).
101. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2327-29 (Alito, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 2340 (Souter, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2341.
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isted, even now when there is little doubt that, no matter how high the stan-
dard is set, the standard can be met through a DNA test.
CONCLUSION
The Roberts Court has demonstrated a palpable fear of the effect of
wrongful convictions on the criminal justice system. However, the fear that
the entire system of criminal justice will come crumbling down is unjusti-
fied. Justice Scalia is right that we have to live with an imperfect system-
we will occasionally convict the wrong person even if we do everything we
can to ensure the most reliable proceedings.' 04 We know that eyewitnesses
have sworn on the bible that this is the man who they saw kill another man
when they were quite simply mistaken. 105
The man falsely imprisoned and the real perpetrator are likely the only
ones who know he is innocent. However, if the innocent man was given the
fairest possible trial (were there such a thing) and yet he cannot prove his
innocence with some degree of certainty, the painful reality is that there is
little we can do with his claim of innocence. In a rare few cases, the inno-
cent man has the kind of proof that convinces hardened courts-a DNA test
showing he could not have been the perpetrator. As Herrera could only
hypothesize at the time, "a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual inno-
cence"' can now be shown.
While Herrera contemplated a constitutional claim of freestanding
innocence only in capital cases, it is not significantly less shocking to the
conscience of a civilized nation to send an innocent man to prison than it is
to execute him. It is equally violative of the due process and the cruel and
unusual punishment clauses of the Constitution to send an innocent man to
his death or to send him to prison. 10 6 An obvious corollary to the due proc-
ess right to relief from imprisonment is the right to make one's proof of
innocence through DNA testing.
104. At this point in time, the sources of wrongful convictions are well known and include faulty
eyewitness testimony, unreliable snitches, bad forensic evidence, false confessions, prosecutorial mis-
conduct and ineffective defense lawyers. Measures can be taken by law enforcement and the courts to
minimize some of the dangers, such as videotaping confessions, following best practices for identifica-
tion procedures, and overseeing the delivery of services by overworked and underpaid defense attor-
neys. See Stopping Wrongful Convictions Before They Happen, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/
(last visited Sept. 1, 2009) (describing procedures that have been and can be taken to fix the problems).
105. See Eyewitness Misidentification, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-
Misidentification.php (last visited Sept. 1, 2009) (over 75% of DNA exonerations involved faulty
eyewitness testimony).
106. Note that this is a different argument from the death-penalty-specific doctrine where the
existence of a "substantial risk" of arbitrary imposition of the death penalty suggests a violation of the
Eighth Amendment. See supra note 52. There is no corresponding jurisprudence in non-capital cases.
This section discusses the actuality of wrongful convictions, not just the risks.
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A standard of "conclusive exoneration," 107 as articulated in House v.
Bell, would work for bullet-proof Herrera/DNA claims. However, that
standard may well prove problematic in practice. In more than one case of
DNA exoneration, a prosecutor has balked at the suggestion that his or her
office prosecuted the wrong man.108 For example, in light of DNA evi-
dence proving the defendant could not have been the depositor of semen at
a rape scene, a prosecutor's office then maintained that a second person
must have accompanied the defendant. 109 It has been an instinctive reaction
of prosecutors to find doubt even in the face of DNA evidence of inno-
cence.
In the eyes of some, no proof will ever be conclusive. After all, some
evidence must have initially led to the arrest of the defendant, as in the case
of Paul House: there may always be some nagging doubt, even if not en-
tirely reasonable. A standard just below "conclusiveness"--such as one
that would require that no reasonable juror would find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, given the totality of the evidence, old and
new1 10- is about as close as human beings can come to certainty. A pris-
oner who can make that "extraordinary" showing has surely met the hypo-
thetical "truly persuasive" case of innocence that Herrera requires for a
constitutionally-recognized freestanding claim of innocence. In the case of
a prisoner who can produce evidence of a DNA test conclusively showing
his innocence, there is little question that this standard is met.
107. 547 U.S. 518, 553-54 (2006).
108. See Brief for Individuals Exonerated by Post-Conviction DNA Testing as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 16-17, Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S.
Ct. 2308 (2009) (No. 08-6) (describing the case of Kirk Bloodsworth, where DNA tests proved he was
not the perpetrator and he was given a gubernatorial pardon, but where prosecutors maintained his guilt
for ten years thereafter); Kennedy Brewer, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/l176.php (last
visited Sept. 25, 2009) (describing case of Kennedy Brewer, where his conviction was overturned when
a DNA test proved he did not commit the crime, but the prosecution held him in jail five additional
years in order to retry the case, until he was freed); Murder Case Against Ralph Armstrong Dismissed
After Prosecution Hid Evidence of His Innocence, www.innocenceproject.org/Content/2096.php (last
visited Sept. 25, 2009) (describing case of Ralph Armstrong, where even after the state supreme court
overturned his conviction because of DNA testing showing he could not be the perpetrator, prosecutors
sought to retry the case and withheld further evidence of innocence); Prosecutor Dismisses Case
Against Chris Heins Based on DNA Evidence, www.innocenceproject.org/Content/1051.php (last
visited Sept. 25, 2009) (describing the case of Chad Heins, where DNA tests on hair, victim's finger-
nails and semen on bed all excluded perpetrator and prosecutor dismissed case but refused to concede
innocence).
109. See, e.g., Robert Miller, www.innocenceProject.org/Content/219.php (last visited Sept. 25,
2009) (describing case of Robert Miller).
110. This is basically the standard proposed for a freestanding innocence claim by Justice White in
Herrera. See supra note 29. Professor Garrett has proposed the lower Schiup "more likely than not"
standard for all innocence claims, which would lead to a new trial or sentence. Garrett, supra note 89, at
1710-11. 1 differentiate between the two standards, creating a slightly higher one for freestanding
innocence claims, because it is my belief that if this standard is met, there is no cause for a retrial, as the
standard suggests.
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Justice Stevens' rhetorical waxing on innocence in Schiup would now
have real meaning if the claim actually led to the release of the wrongly
convicted:
[T]he individual interest in avoiding injustice is most compelling in the
context of actual innocence. The quintessential miscarriage of justice is
the execution of a person who is entirely innocent. Indeed, concern about
the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person has
long been at the core of our criminal justice system.1 I I
While petitioners who met the slightly lower "more likely than not"
standard in Schiup could make their gateway claim, petitioners who met the
higher standard proposed here would be released from custody, as no rea-
sonable juror would find them guilty on retrial.
Innocence Projects around the country cannot help every actually
innocent person in prison. Nor can the Supreme Court. However, where
Innocence Projects are transparent about what they are doing, the Supreme
Court is opaque. Members of the Court are concerned about wrongful con-
victions, but not concerned enough to pull the plug on the death penalty.
Members of the Court are aware that DNA tests have exonerated people
who have spent substantial periods of time in prison, but still cannot say
that a DNA test can be enough to meet the Herrera standard for actual
innocence. "Truly persuasive" claims of innocence are knocking at the
Court's door, and the Court should answer.
111. 513U.S.298,324-25.
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